It is well known that lower channel profits are achieved in the bilateral (manufacturer-re seller) monopoly if manufacturer and reseller independently optimize their respective profits: They take each other's decisions as given i.e., adopt decision rules that ignore their influence on the other channel member. Higher profits are achieved if they coordinate their profit maximiz ing decisions. Consequently, there is an economic justification for (1) vertical integration that by definition prevents conflicting profit objectives or (2) contracts that change channel members' incentives to the compatible objectives of shares of total channel profits. This paper investigates the possibility that coordination might take place without formal arrangements like vertical integration or contracts. The reason for this contention is the casual observation that channel members are often acutely aware of the interdependencies between channel partici pants. We might thus expect that they will form conjectures about other channel members' reactions to their own actions. We show that rational conjectures lead profit maximizing channel members to adopt modified decisions rules. Can such conjectural decision-making create, at least partially, channel coordination or cooperation? In other words, can channel members deviate from the Nash equilibrium and thus achieve greater profits? The answer given in this paper is a conditional yes.
Introduction
Most economic situations are characterized by obvious interdependencies between the participating economic agents, at least when their number is fairly small; these agents may be consumers, firms, institutions, governments, etc. Because participating economic agents are well aware of the existence of these interdependencies, they often make conjectures concerning the other agents' reactions to their own decisions. Since channels of distribution involve suppliers, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers who clearly are in a situation of mutual dependence, one would expect that conjectures would play a significant role in the formation of decisions within the channel and thus influence the equilibrium of the channel. For example, a manufacturer contemplating an increase in his ex-factory price will try to anticipate the downstream ripple effects before deciding on a particular increase. Similarly, a retailer or distributor will conjec ture how the adoption of different marketing policies influence the manufacturer. Recently, Jeuland and Shugan (1983a, b) have studied channel decisions. They found that uncoordinated actions-independent decisions on the part of channel memberslead to lower profits: price is too high, quality is too low, shelf-space is too small. Several practices have been adopted to remedy this problem and achieve coordination. These practices include vertical integration and contracts. In particular, variable-price con tracts of a special form-quantity discounts 1 -can create a linkage between manufac turer profits and retailer profits. Under such arrangements, maximization of either the manufacturer's or their retailer's objective function leads to the maximization of total channel profits (see Jeuland-Shugan 1983b, pp. 253-254) . These quantity discounts change both the manufacturer's objective and the retailer's objective to the compatible goals of complementary shares (they sum to one) of channel profits. 2 The lack of coordination (lower profits), observed when economic agents make independent decisions (they take one another's actions as given and not subject to influence), might result from the fact that these agents do not expect any reactions to their own decisions. If we relax this assumption by allowing channel members to form conjectures about the other channel members' reactions to their own actions, we might expect that rational conjectures would result in higher channel profits. The objective of this paper is to verify whether this contention is true or not.
Recent research in economics has begun to deal with the problem of constructing duopoly or oligopoly models with "consistent conjectural variations". In this paper, we adopt a similar approach and investigate general demand functions. This is in contrast to Shugan (1985) who considers the case of the constant elasticity demand. In this respect the present paper is a generalization of Shugan (1985) . On the other hand, by considering a specific demand function, Shugan is able to investigate other important aspects of the problem, i.e., dynamics which will be ignored in the present paper. In fact, these dynamics partially drive Shugan's results because our application to his case of constant elasticity demand does not coincide with Shugan's Theorem 1. However, as will be shown later, our results confirm Shugan's basic qualitative result of increased channel profits over Nash equilibrium (zero conjectures) profits.
Definitions of the Notions of Conjecture and Consistency of Conjecture
In oligopoly theory, conjectures are defined as the firm's expectations about the reactions of its competitors to actions it contemplates. For example, Cournot's duopoly model of two firms selling a homogeneous good postulates that each firm expects no reaction on the part of its competitor. Formally, we express this assumption as (dqjdqj) e = 0 where q, is the quantity sold by firm i, i = 1,2 and e is the subscript denoting an expectation or conjecture. We see that (dq,/dqj) e specifies what change firm; expects in firm z's decision, dq" if it changes its own decision by the amount dq r Bertrand also postulated naive behavior, but Bertrand assumed that each firm would consider the other firms' prices (rather than quantities) to be fixed (Horowitz 1970) . In contrast to Bertrand and Cournot who derived equilibria without conjectures, Stackelberg permit ted one sophisticated duopolist (i.e., the leader) to determine and incorporate the less 1 We define quantity discounts simply as a lower price per unit when larger quantities are bought. 2 In this respect, we differ from Moorthy (1987) . The quantity discount of Jeuland/Shugan (1983b) is necessary to make both manufacturer profits and retailer profits vary with channel profits when the latter fluctuate because of the decisions of manufacturer and reseller. In other words, the quantity discount of Jeuland-Shugan (1983b) achieves channel coordination and both manufacturer and reseller benefit when the channel moves toward coordination (see Jeuland-Shugan 1987) . sophisticated duopolist's (i.e., the follower's) reaction curve into his own profit-maxi mizing computations (Horowitz 1970) . Cournot (1838 ), Fisher (1898 and Bowley (1924) recognized long ago that these conjectures are exogenous to the models and thus not necessarily consistent or rational. Consistency or rationality means that if firm / has predictions about the actions of firm j (j ¥= i; i,j =1,2) and if these predictions turn out to be wrong, firm i will notice the error, change its expectations and modify its decision rules accordingly. Ultimately, the process should converge toward consistent or rational conjectures, i.e., the expectation (dqj/dqj) e should equal the actual reaction (dqjdq]) a at the equilibrium \{dqildq]) a denotes the actual reaction function].
Recently, several researchers have tackled the problem of defining equilibria with consistent conjectural variations (see Bresnahan 1981 and Kamien and Schwartz 1983) . There are really two different issues that must be addressed when trying to build duopoly or oligopoly models with consistent conjectural variations. One is the existence and nature of the equilibria. The other is the dynamics of convergence toward equilib rium. The latter is a particularly challenging one because of the dynamics involved. For this reason, we will not, in this paper, model the dynamics of convergence toward the equilibrium (see Shugan 1985 for such a model). We thus only study the characteristics of the consistent conjectural equilibrium of the channel and contrast it to the Nash equilibrium. The latter assumes zero conjectures even though the actual reactions are nonzero.
A Simple Model of Channel of Distribution With Consistent Conjectures

A. Basic Definitions and Notations
For purpose of exposition, we keep the same channel structure as in Jeuland-Shugan (1983a, b) . Let us assume a symmetric two-member channel with a manufacturer and a reseller. The reseller is, in the local market, the exclusive distributor of the manufac turer's single product. The reseller faces a downward sloping demand function.
For the purpose of keeping notations simple, we denote by capital letters what refers to the manufacturer and small letters what relates to the reseller:
F, /total fixed costs for the manufacturer and reseller, respectively, C, c variable costs of manufacturer and reseller per unit for the product under study, n, w profit functions of manufacturer and reseller, D(p) consumer demand as a function of final price p, G, g unit margins of manufacturer and reseller. We assume that D' < 0 and D" §; 0 where £>' = dD(p)/dp and D" = d^pydp 2 . Given the preceding notations and assumptions, manufacturer profits are given by II = GD -F and reseller profits by ir = gD -f. The final price p and the channel profits ■K + II are outcomes of the channel member decisions, i.e., G and g. Consequently,
The downward sloping demand function, which is a function of final price, is also a function of all competitive factors beyond the direct control of this channel. One assumption is to take these factors as fixed parameters in the demand function. One then obtains a partial equilibrium of the industry. On the other hand, because the channel's reseller has some market power and influence due to the downward sloping demand function, reactions of the competing resellers might occur. This would lead to a derived demand function. This case would still be handled by the above model if the derived demand function is assumed to be downward sloping. (See the example given in the Appendix of Jeuland-Shugan 1983a .)
The preceding formulation is perfectly symmetric with respect to the manufacturer and the retailer. Throughout this paper, we assume that the manufacturer has control over his margin G and the reseller over his margin g. It follows from the preceding formulation that the final price results from the combination of the manufacturer's decision G and of the reseller's decision g: pis given by p=G+g+C+c as stated above. This assumption of symmetry is easier to justify for our model because it is static in nature and there is thus no notion of one decision preceding the other. 3 We denote the manufacturer's conjecture concerning the reseller's reaction to his own margin decision by A, i.e., (dg/dG) e = 8g/8G = A. In order to simplify notations "5" will be used to signify conjecture i.e., anticipated change; "d" will mean actual change. The manufacturer expects the reseller to change his margin by A8G as a response to the manufacturer's margin change of 8G. Symmetrically, the reseller's conjecture is (dG/dg) e = 8G/8g = X.
B. Derivation of Conditions for Rationality
We can now write the first order necessary conditions for profit maximization by manufacturer and reseller. These conditions are given by equations (1) and (2), respec tively (D' = dD/dp):
A sufficient condition for the first order conditions (1) and (2) to correspond to maximum profits are the second order conditions which require (1 + A)(2D' -DD"/ £>') < 0 and (1 + X)(2D' -DD"/D') < 0. The condition 2D' -DD"/D' < 0 i.e., 2D' 2 > DD", is satisfied for commonly used demand functions: constant elasticity, ap~", J? > 1; linear, a -bp; exponential ae~f fp ; algebraic (ap + b)~a, a > 1. The above sufficient second order conditions thus require A > -1 and X > -1.
The decision rule of the manufacturer given by equation (1) implicitly defines the manufacturer's actual margin G as a function of reseller's margin g. Similarly, equation (2) implicitly defines the reseller's margin g as a function of G. Hence, by implicit differentiation of (1) with respect to g, we obtain dG/dg, the actual reaction function of the manufacturer. If dG/dg is equal to 8G/8g = X, the reseller is said to have a consistent or rational conjecture because the manufacturer's actions match the reseller's expecta tion. Symmetrically for the manufacturer, if 8g/8G = A is equal to dgfdG obtained by implicitly differentiating the decision rule of the reseller, the manufacturer has a con sistent conjecture. By implicitly differentiating (1) and (2) and replacing dG/dg by X and dg/dG by A the necessary conditions for a rational conjectural equilibrium are
The four nonlinear equations (l)-(4) with the four unknowns G, g, A and X specify a channel equilibrium-if it exists-where channel members' conjectures are rational, i.e., match actual channel member decisions and decision rules (G and dG/dg for the manufacturer; g and dg/dG for the reseller) at the equilibrium point. Proposition 1 results directly from (l)-(4). The reader will note that for commonly used demand functions DD"/D' 2 < 2 so that A = X < 1. We can now investigate the difference between the rational conjectural equilibrium just characterized and the Nash equilibrium (the latter results from manufacturer and reseller assuming A = X = 0 and not noticing that the resulting actual reactions may be nonzero).
From Proposition 2 is easy to prove and implies that a rational conjectural equilibrium will not coincide with the maximum channel profit point for commonly used demand functions. In other words, we cannot expect the formation of conjectures to result in perfect coordination of the channel. (Channel profits are maximized at the conjectural equilibrium point only if the demand function satisfies, at that point, the local condi tion DD" -2D' 2 = 0. The class of demand functions D(p) = \/{a + bp) satisfies this condition everywhere. However this class of demand function is somewhat pathological because it implies that channel revenues or channel gross profits do not go toward zero as the price becomes very high. In general, for other demand functions, maximum profits are achieved via conjectures if the demand functions' second order approxima tion at the rational conjectural equilibrium point is given by
Obviously this is the second order approximation around p s of £KP) = l/(a + bp) and thus explains the above stated result for this class of demand functions.)
For commonly used demand functions that satisfy DD" < 2D' 2 , then -1 < A = X < +1. This results in p s being larger than p*. p s cannot be smaller than p* because this would imply A = X > 1, an inequality incompatible with DD" < 2D' 2 . When the reaction (e.g. X) to a channel member (e.g. reseller) for his margin increase is larger, i.e. the other channel member (manufacturer) increases his own margin more, then the channel becomes more optimal (as A -*■ 1 _ and X -*■ 1 _, p s -*■ pf). Unfortu nately, if we also impose that this reaction be rational ("expected" matches "actual" decisions), then only unusual demand functions achieve complete coordination. This statement may actually be too strong because the condition is really only a local condition. However, we see that commonly used demand functions do not even meet this local condition. One can actually interpret A and X as punishment. When the manufacturer increases his margin G by the amount AG, he increases his unit profit but sells fewer units because the final price p = G + g+C + c also increases by AG. If the margin increase AG triggers an increase Ag = A • AG, price increases more, Ap = AG( 1 + A) > AG, and thus volume decreases more. The larger A > 0 (symmetrically X), the larger the punishment beyond the natural volume decrease directly attributable to the margin increase. Finally, note that A < 0 is a reward: The reseller would decrease his margin as a result of the manufacturer's increase AG (as A < 0 and X < 0 decrease, the channel becomes less optimal because p s increases more and more). We come back to this case later.
In summary, we have found that the rational conjectural equilibrium does not gener ally coincide with either Nash behavior or channel coordination (channel profits being maximized). The logical next step is thus to ask whether rational conjectural profits may be a partial improvement at least upon Nash equilibrium profits. We address this via Proposition 3. By regularity conditions on the demand function, we seek a well-behaved function of gross channel profits i.e., (p -C -c)D(p), which first increases with p to its maximum at p*, and then declines. It switches from concavity to convexity at p s (p s is an inflexion point of the gross channel profits as implied by Proposition 1).
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that only "punishment" of the profit maxi mizing channel partner can achieve partial coordination. And punishment of the channel partner can only take place if A > 0 or X > 0: a margin increase translates into a retaliatory margin increase and additional decrease in volume sold. By symmetry, we expect that compensating for the channel partner's margin increase (A < 0 or X < 0) makes the channel worse off than under Nash equilibrium (A = X = 0 are assumed): when A < 0 the retailer de facto rewards the manufacturer who increases his margin by AG by decreasing his own margin by A • AG < 0, i.e., permitting the sales volume not to decrease as much as it should since Ap = (1 + A)AG < AG when A < 0.
Before applying the results of Propositions 1-3 to commonly used demand functions, a word on the often made Stackelberg assumption is in order. The Stackelberg leaderfollower assumption postulates that the reseller's conjecture, X, is zero; furthermore the manufacturer recognizes X = 0 and the implied decision rule for the reseller: D + gD' = 0 (equation (2) Our results indicate that a leader-follower channel will not be coordinated because the condition A = X = 1 cannot be met because X = 0. Furthermore, unless A = 0 is a solution to the preceding implicit differentiation equation, the leader-follower arrange ment is not a rational conjectural equilibrium because the latter requires A = X = -1 + DD"/D' 2 . However, for exponential demand functions, D(p) = ae~e", this condition is met with A = X = 0 In the next section it is shown that for exponential functions, leader-follower, Nash and rational conjectural equilibria are all identical. Table 1 applies the theoretical results of §C to the four demand situations of constant elasticity, linear demand, exponential demand and algebraic demand.
D. Applications of Rational Conjectural Equilibria to Different Demand Functions
The general propositions stated in the previous section will help us understand the results of Table 1 . First, whatever demand function is considered, Nash equilibrium price p c is higher than optimum channel price p*. This is also the result discussed in Jeuland-Shugan (1983b) . For the constant elasticity demand function and the algebraic demand function, the rational conjectural price p s is intermediate between p* and p c 
Actual reaction function given conjectures A = X = A:
Rational conjectural variation and corresponding reactions from equation (6) 
Nash equilibrium °e-gc and thus corresponds to partial coordination of the channel in the Jeuland-Shugan sense, i.e., increased profitability over independent decision making defined by the Nash equilibrium point p c -However rational conjectures do not lead to complete coordination since p* < p s in all cases. The only instance where rational conjectures would lead to perfect coordination is a -*■ 1+ (algebraic function) and thus unit conjec tures A = X -*■ 1 + (see Proposition 2). Also note in this case that the Nash equilibrium does not exist. (1) and (2) reduce to D = 0. This gives the highest price possible p s = a/b (where demand vanishes) as the conjectural equilibrium price. It is interesting to note that the linear demand is the only case of the four considered in Table 1 where the rational conjectural variations are negative (A = X = -1). Even though this situation is a rational conjecture, it may be an unlikely event and could thus be considered pathological. Indeed, can a channel member be expected to decrease his margin when a partner increases his? It is because a channel member would completely compensate for a margin increase by his partner (by decreasing his margin by an equal amount) that the highest price possible (at D = 0) results in this equilibrium. Because selfish behavior is rewarded, the channel is worse off in the end.
We now summarize our results. To the question "Can channel members who antici pate reactions to their own actions by other channel members develop rational conjec tures that lead to de facto cooperation or coordination within the channel?", our answer must be qualified; at least within the formalization of the previous section. For conjec tural variations bg/bG = A and bG/bg = X, we found that the form of the demand function matters. The constant elasticity demand function leads to a nontrivial rational conjectural equilibrium with the conjectural variation being the inverse of the demand elasticity. Furthermore, the conjectural equilibrium channel profits were found to be superior to the uncoordinated (Nash equilibrium) profits although less than maximum channel profits attainable. The same results were obtained with the class of algebraic demand functions D(p) = l/(ap + b) a , a > 2. Rational conjectural behavior can thus lead to some form of coordination. This is confirmation of the initial intuition in Shugan (1985) . However, rational conjectures may not improve the profitability of the channel: for the exponential demand case, Nash and the conjectural equilibria coincide. Finally, for the linear demand case, conjectural profits are actually worse than Nash.
In summary, because rational conjectures do not achieve perfect coordination, there may be reason to believe that formal arrangements like vertical integration and variable price contracts, are needed to insure channel coordination.
Extension of the Model and Conclusions
Every time economic agents are in situations of interdependence and/or competi tion, they will try to anticipate their partners' and/or competitors' behavior, i.e., form conjectures about the reactions to their own decisions. We have applied the notion of conjectures to the analysis of mutual interdependence between channel members.
We should consider other marketing variables besides margins, for example, product quality, retail display, etc., that are controlled by the manufacturer or the retailer.
Conjectures about these may be formed as well. The notion of rational conjectures may not work the same way for these variables as for price and margin decisions.
In addition, the model considered in §3 only dealt with the equilibrium point. In practice, the economic agents will be involved in dynamic scenarios where they update their conjectures and consequently their behavior. A fully dynamic model of learning (e.g., Bayesian updating) is needed to achieve this. Moreover, in real situations, the formation of conjectures will be most affected by the economic agents' uncertainty concerning costs and demand elasticity.
Finally, a channel of distribution cannot be studied in isolation from the competitive environment. In practice, the retailer would also form conjectures about the behavior of the other retailers with whom he competes. For example, if, in a local market, there are two retailers selling two differentiated products 5 (demand for product / is D,(Pi, p } ) with p, the price of product /' , i,j = 1,2, i ¥=j), each retailer is expected to form conjectures bPjIbPi-The model should then consider these conjectures as well as the conjectures defined in §3 dGJdg, and dg,/8G,.
In sum, the methodology of conjectural variation should be further explored for the analysis of interdependencies between channel members. More general results than the ones obtained in §3 are needed concerning the important question of whether channel coordination can be achieved-at least partially-by other methods than formal ar rangements like vertical integration and price contracts. Until this more thorough investigation is performed it is not possible to pass definitive judgment on the useful ness of rational conjectural variations as a tool to model sophisticated behavior of interdependent channel members.
This fundamental research needs to be supplemented with empirical research: do channel members form conjectures and if so, about what decision variables? The interplay of theory and data is likely to be the most fruitful approach for a better understanding of interdependent economic agents like manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. This paper provides only a starting point for structuring this investigation. 
